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Responsibility
Neal A. Tognazzini
The notion of responsibility is vexed, both conceptually and metaphysically. It is 
invoked in a bewildering variety of contexts, and in many of those contexts its very 
possibility is questioned. Ordinary language is not of much help: people can be 
responsible, become responsible, and be held responsible; they can have  responsibilities, 
claim responsibility, take responsibility – and the list of verbs goes on. Our “modern 
scientific worldview” is often thought to undermine  responsibility, yet we regret that 
politicians and teenagers don’t take it more seriously. It is, like most philosophically 
interesting concepts, remarkably easy to use but dreadfully  difficult to understand. In 
this essay, I offer what little help I can.
Distinguishing Varieties of Responsibility
Let’s begin by distinguishing four varieties of responsibility – or, if you like, four senses 
of the word “responsibility” and its cognates (for helpful discussion, see Hart 1968).
First, we often speak in the plural of responsibilities, such as those associated with 
being President of the United States or those that come along with becoming a  parent. 
For example, one of my responsibilities as a new father is to help care for my child; it 
is a duty, or an obligation, that I have acquired in virtue of a particular role or 
 relationship (see duty and obligation). This sense of the word is often referred to 
as role responsibility. Certain responsibilities (or duties) attach to my role as a  parent; 
others attach to my role as a professor; still others, perhaps, to my role as a citizen of 
the United States.
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A second sense of the word “responsible” is invoked when we search for causal 
explanations. For example, we might wonder what precise meteorological 
 phenomena are responsible for the humid summer weather. What we are wondering 
about, in this case, is what meteorological phenomena cause the humidity. 
Accordingly, this sense of the word is often referred to as causal responsibility. When 
humans are involved in the explanation of an event, however, it is easy to conflate 
mere causal responsibility with the last two varieties: legal and moral.
Suppose that while I’m at your house for a party, I knock over an expensive vase 
and it shatters on the ground. The vase shattered because it hit the ground, and it hit 
the ground because I knocked it over, so it looks like I figure prominently into the 
causal explanation of the broken vase. I am, in the sense spelled out above, causally 
responsible for the broken vase. But when you come back from the kitchen and ask 
angrily, “Who’s responsible for this?,” you’re likely not simply interested in a causal 
explanation. You also want to know whose fault it is, so that you can know whom 
you should blame (see blame) and perhaps from whom you should request or 
demand compensation.
Determining fault, assigning blame, and demanding compensation are all 
 activities that take us beyond questions of causal responsibility and, depending on 
the details of the case, into the realm of legal or moral responsibility. Suppose, for 
example, that I intentionally and maliciously bumped into the vase. In that case, a 
court might rule that I am on the hook for various legal sanctions, including being 
forced to pay you back and perhaps whatever penalties are associated with willful 
destruction of private property. In making such a ruling, the court would be  deciding 
that I am legally responsible for the broken vase. You might also decide that it would 
be appropriate for you and the other guests at the party to get angry, to resent or 
rebuke me for what I did. In so doing, you would be judging that I am morally 
responsible for breaking the vase, and perhaps you would also be holding me 
 responsible for breaking it.
These four varieties of responsibility – role, causal, legal, and moral – are 
 connected in various ways. Neglecting my role responsibilities, for example, may 
well render me responsible in any or all of the other three senses for the results of 
such neglect, thereby perhaps giving rise to further role responsibilities. Or, to take 
another example, showing that I wasn’t, after all, causally responsible for a negative 
outcome may well get me off the legal and moral hook. But perhaps the deepest con-
nection is that each variety of responsibility is, at least in some sense, concerned with 
attribution or assignment. To have a role responsibility is to have some particular 
action assigned to you; to be causally responsible for something is to have it attrib-
uted to the movements of your body; to be legally responsible for something is to 
have it assigned to you as something that the state can force you to remedy; to be 
morally responsible for something is to have it attributed to the workings of the 
psychological mechanisms that make you a moral agent in the first place (see moral 
agency). Whatever it is, it’s your job, your doing, your liability, your fault.
Though each of these varieties is philosophically interesting, in what follows I will 
focus exclusively on moral responsibility. Readers interested in hearing more about 
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the other varieties are invited to follow the various cross-references listed at the end 
of this essay.
Why Moral Responsibility Matters
What makes moral responsibility so philosophically interesting is, in part, the 
 versatility of the term. Under the general rubric of moral responsibility, ethicists and 
philosophers of law wonder about the nature of praise and blame, the justifiability of 
sanctions, the conceptual and legal difficulties presented by psychopathy (see 
 psychopathy), the precise meaning of desert (see desert), the nature and function 
of forgiveness (see forgiveness), and the centrality of the moral sentiments to our 
interpersonal lives (see sentiments, moral), among much else. And  metaphysicians 
investigate free will (see free will) – and the related topics of dispositions, abilities, 
time, and personal identity – in large part because of its alleged connection to (some 
aspect or other of) moral responsibility.
But moral responsibility is attractive to philosophers for an even deeper reason: 
its centrality to our lives as human beings. For better or worse, we take ourselves to 
be distinctive among animals, and one candidate for what sets us apart is our ability 
to make the sorts of choices for which we can be morally responsible. Again, for 
 better or worse, we seem unable to resist seeing ourselves and our fellow humans as 
appropriate targets of praise and blame, gratitude and resentment, reward and 
 punishment. This outlook would be wrongheaded – or perhaps even impossible – if 
not for the existence of moral responsibility. In short: moral responsibility seems to 
be an essential component of life as we know it. To understand ourselves fully, then, 
we must understand moral responsibility.
One of the main obstacles to understanding moral responsibility, however, is that 
it seems to mean something slightly different to everyone. For one thing, there is 
disagreement about what, precisely, it means to say that someone is morally 
 responsible (both in general and for some particular action or outcome). But there 
is also disagreement and confusion (perhaps as a consequence of the first problem) 
about the precise relationship between moral responsibility, on the one hand, and 
the notions of blameworthiness, answerability, accountability, attributability, desert, 
and punishment (see punishment), on the other. Let me say a bit about each of 
these problems.
The Concept of Moral Responsibility
The most popular view of what it means to say that someone is morally responsible is 
derived from P. F. Strawson’s (1962) remarkably influential paper “Freedom and 
Resentment,” so a brief discussion of Strawson’s paper will prove fruitful (see 
 strawson, p. f.). It is a landmark work of philosophy for many reasons, but two are 
most relevant for our purposes. First, it sparked a renewed appreciation and respect 
for “what it is actually like to be involved in ordinary interpersonal relationships” 
(Strawson 2003: 77), which can only be understood by “attending to that complicated 
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web of attitudes and feelings which form an essential part of the moral life as we know 
it” (Strawson 2003: 91), namely the reactive attitudes (see attitudes, reactive), 
which include “gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt  feelings” (Strawson 
2003: 75). Second, Strawson’s essay urges us to see moral responsibility as constituted 
by our actual practices of holding one another responsible – responding to ill-will 
with resentment and indignation, for example – rather than seeing our practices as 
constrained by independent metaphysical facts about the agent in question.
Each of these contributions was meant to combat what Strawson saw as two 
 competing but equally pernicious attempts among his contemporaries to “overintel-
lectualize the facts” (Strawson 2003: 91). On the one hand, there were those – 
Strawson called them the optimists – who argued that to be morally responsible is 
simply to be the sort of being who can be effectively influenced by punishment and 
condemnation. If punishing someone would succeed in “regulating behavior in 
socially desirable ways” (Strawson 2003: 89), then that person counts as morally 
responsible; if not, then not. The beauty of this view about the nature of moral 
responsibility is that it provides a quick and easy response to millennia of worry 
about whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism (the view that 
the past and the laws of nature determine a unique future): even if determinism were 
true, some people would clearly be susceptible to influence by punishment, and 
hence determinism poses no threat at all to moral responsibility. The problem with 
the view, however, is that “it loses sight (perhaps wishes to lose sight) of the human 
attitudes of which these practices are, in part, the expression” (Strawson 2003: 92). It 
is “a characteristically incomplete empiricism, a one-eyed utilitarianism” (Strawson 
2003: 92), and it ignores the human element of moral responsibility that Strawson 
sought to recapture by focusing on the reactive attitudes.
On the other hand, there were those who recognized that our practices of 
 punishment expressed more than the mere desire to regulate behavior, but who 
argued that, therefore, “the man who is the subject of justified punishment, blame or 
moral condemnation must really deserve it” (Strawson 2003: 74) in a sense that 
implies the existence of a robust sort of free will that couldn’t be had in a  deterministic 
universe. This theorist – Strawson calls him the pessimist – sees the justifiability of 
our practices of punishment and blame as being constrained by some independent 
metaphysical facts about the agent himself, namely whether he acted with “contra 
causal freedom” (Strawson 2003: 92) or some other relevant, but difficult-to- 
articulate, capacity. This view certainly avoids the charge of inhumanity that was 
leveled against the one-eyed utilitarian, but Strawson finds it equally problematic 
because it represents a mysterious and hasty appeal to “obscure and panicky 
 metaphysics” (Strawson 2003: 93) that, it turns out, is completely unnecessary. The 
optimist (from above) was wrong to ignore the reactive attitudes, but he was right to 
try to ground moral responsibility in our practices rather than in obscure meta-
physical facts about free will. Accordingly – and here’s the second contribution 
I mentioned above – Strawson argues that we ought to construe moral responsibility 
as being constituted by the emotionally laden and firmly entrenched framework 
provided by the reactive attitudes.
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So, we have now seen three competing views about what it means to say that 
someone is morally responsible. According to the utilitarian view (Strawson’s 
 optimists), to be morally responsible is simply to be the sort of being who can be 
effectively influenced by punishment and condemnation. According to what we 
might call the metaphysical view (Strawson’s pessimists), to be morally responsible is 
to possess some sort of robust capacity in virtue of which punishment and condem-
nation are deserved. According to Strawson, to be morally responsible is to be on the 
receiving end of those deeply human attitudes and feelings – the reactive attitudes – 
that express the community’s general demand for goodwill. From the reactive 
 attitudes alone, Strawson argues, we can capture “a sense of what we mean, i.e., of all 
we mean, when, speaking the language of morals, we speak of desert, responsibility, 
guilt, condemnation, and justice” (Strawson 2003: 91). An understanding of human 
nature is essential, but obscure metaphysics is not.
I said above that the most popular answer to the question of what it means to say 
that someone is morally responsible is derived from Strawson, but it isn’t Strawson’s. 
Although there is disagreement about how exactly to interpret Strawson’s essay (for 
a helpful way into the debate, see McKenna and Russell 2008), most contemporary 
philosophers seem to think that he conflates being morally responsible with being 
held morally responsible, notions that ought to be kept apart. It is one thing for the 
moral community to treat someone as if she is morally responsible – by, say, targeting 
her with the reactive attitudes – but it is quite another for it to be appropriate for the 
moral community to do so, and Strawson, at least at first glance, appears to gloss 
over this distinction. (Or, perhaps better, he sees no use for it, since he sees the 
notion of appropriateness as a “pitiful intellectualist trinket for a philosopher to 
wear as a charm against the recognition of his own humanity” [Strawson 2003: 92].)
If we take this distinction seriously, then we arrive at the most prominent 
 contemporary answer to the question of what it means to say that someone is  morally 
responsible, what we might call Strawsonianism: to be morally responsible is to be an 
apt or appropriate target of the reactive attitudes. (Two prominent examples of this 
view are Wallace 1994; Fischer and Ravizza 1998.) This amendment, in a sense, 
makes Strawsonianism a revised version of the metaphysical view articulated above, 
since what makes the reactive attitudes appropriate will be some independent meta-
physical facts about the agent. Crucially, however, the Strawsonian maintains (as he 
must, if he is to avoid a vicious circularity) that the agent’s being morally responsible 
is not among the independent facts that render the reactive attitudes appropriate. 
Rather, the fact (if it is a fact) that the agent is morally responsible just is the fact that 
the reactive attitudes are appropriate. The capacities that are required for moral 
responsibility, then, are discovered by examining the norms that govern our reactive 
attitudes, and those norms do not themselves involve reference to any alleged 
 independent fact about moral responsibility.
Strawsonianism is perhaps the most common view of the nature of moral 
 responsibility, but it is not the only one. There is also the ledger view, which says that 
to be morally responsible is to be “such that there are ‘credits’ or ‘debits’ in one’s 
‘ personal ledger,’ so that one is worthy of being judged to have such credits or debits” 
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(Zimmerman 1988: 7–8). This is a metaphorical statement of the view, of course, but 
the central point is that the facts about whether someone is morally responsible are 
determined wholly by facts about the agent and not at all by reference to the norms 
that govern our practices of blame and punishment (as in the Strawsonian view). It 
is, then, a metaphysical view of moral responsibility in the sense that Strawson’s 
 pessimist’s view is metaphysical: it construes responsibility as a metaphysical fact 
about the agent that is independent of our practices.
One last view to mention is the accountability view (Oshana 1997), which lies 
somewhere between Strawsonianism and the ledger view. According to this view, to 
be morally responsible is to be the sort of person who ought to account for her 
behavior by explaining her intentions and beliefs in acting (or, perhaps, to be the 
sort of person who does things for which it is fitting that she give an account). This 
is not quite the Strawsonian view because it makes no essential reference to the 
norms that govern the reactive attitudes; indeed, according to this view, the reactive 
attitudes are appropriate only if the agent is accountable in this more basic sense. But 
it is also not quite the ledger view because it has a social dimension: the sort of facts 
that constitute moral responsibility are facts about when explanations ought to be 
offered.
For better or worse, alternatives to Strawsonianism remain under-explored. 
Fortunately, although I will sometimes take elements of the Strawsonian view for 
granted in what follows, I don’t think it is essential to any of the issues and problems 
that remain to be discussed.
The Many Faces of Moral Responsibility
We have just explored the disagreement about what, precisely, it means to say that 
someone is morally responsible, but the other (related) obstacle to a solid 
 understanding of moral responsibility is disagreement and confusion about the 
 precise relationship between moral responsibility, on the one hand, and the notions 
of blameworthiness, answerability, accountability, attributability, desert, and 
 punishment, on the other.
I suggested above that the varieties of responsibility are perhaps unified by a 
 concern with attribution or assignment, and this certainly seems to be part of what 
is at issue in discussions of moral responsibility: after all, if some action can’t  properly 
be attributed to you, then it looks like it will be inappropriate to resent you for it, or 
judge that it has resulted in a debit from your moral ledger, or expect you to explain 
yourself. On the other hand, even if some unsavory action can properly be attributed 
to you, that doesn’t by itself mean that it will be appropriate to resent you for it. 
Attributability, while relevant to the propriety of the reactive attitudes, is neverthe-
less a distinct concern. A closer look reveals many more aspects of moral  responsibility 
that are worth distinguishing.
The credit for drawing attention to the different “faces” of moral responsibility 
goes to Gary Watson (2004a), who distinguishes between an attributability face and 
an accountability face. Perhaps the best way to grasp the distinction is to consider 
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Watson’s example of “the vicious criminal who is himself a victim of an abusive 
childhood” (Watson 2004a: 280; see also Watson 1987). Watson notes that we tend 
to feel ambivalent toward such a criminal: on the one hand, he is “malicious and 
cruel in a sense that no nonreflective being could be” and his conduct “expresses and 
constitutes his practical identity, what he stands for, what he has made of his life as 
he found it” (Watson 2004a: 281); on the other hand, we are drawn toward pity 
rather than blame by “the thought that the individual has already suffered too much 
and that we too would probably have been morally ruined by such a childhood” 
(Watson 2004a: 281). Watson explains this ambivalence by invoking the distinction 
between attributability and accountability.
One thing our concept of moral responsibility does is provide a way to distinguish 
between creatures who have a “practical identity” – a capacity to evaluate and adopt 
ends and act in ways that express those evaluative commitments – and those who do 
not. Many nonhuman animals may be responsible in the causal sense for certain 
happenings, but they cannot be responsible in the sense that those happenings are 
attributable to them in a way that opens them up to aretaic appraisals – assessments 
that concern “the agent’s excellences and faults – or virtues and vices – as manifested 
in thought and action” (Watson 2004a: 266). Actions that express “what one is about” 
(Watson 2004a: 270) or where one stands on fundamental matters of evaluation are 
actions for which one is answerable, and hence – in a sense – responsible. The vicious 
criminal is not an animal; his actions do, despite his horrific childhood, reflect his 
evaluative commitments, and thus are attributable to him in the relevant sense (see 
autonomy).
Nevertheless, we may think his abusive childhood colors his crime in a way that 
calls for pity rather than blame. According to Watson, this reflects a concern about 
whether the criminal is morally responsible in the sense of accountability: whether 
he really deserves to be subjected to the reactive attitudes, sanctions, or punishment 
(where these involve an expression of condemnation that would be absent from, say, 
locking him up merely to protect ourselves). This is an equally legitimate way of 
talking about moral responsibility, but it is distinct from responsibility understood 
as attributability, which seems more about “the relation of an individual to her 
behavior” rather than the “social setting in which we demand (require) certain con-
duct from one another and respond adversely to one another’s failures to comply 
with these demands” (Watson 2004a: 262).
But how does this all relate to the discussion about different ways to cash out the 
concept of moral responsibility? It’s hard to say, actually, since there has been too 
little clarity about this issue in the literature. However, I can offer some thoughts of 
my own.
Recall the formula that I identified above as Strawsonianism: to be morally 
responsible is to be an apt or appropriate target of the reactive attitudes. Is this a 
statement about attributability or accountability? I suspect that the answer to this 
question depends on how we understand the Strawsonian formula. To name a few 
possibilities, do we mean: (1) it wouldn’t be a category mistake to target one with the 
reactive attitudes, (2) it would be permissible to target one with the reactive  attitudes, 
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(3) it would be wrong not to target one with the reactive attitudes, (4) it wouldn’t be 
unfair to target one with the reactive attitudes, (5) one deserves to be targeted with 
the reactive attitudes, or perhaps (6) that there is in fact someone who is entitled to 
target one with the reactive attitudes?
If appropriateness is understood as “not a category mistake,” then I think it is 
plausible to interpret Strawsonianism as a view about attributability. After all, even 
though we are inclined to withhold blame and sanctions from the vicious criminal 
with an abusive childhood, the fact that his actions express his “fundamental evalu-
ative orientation” seems to show that he is in general the sort of creature who could 
be (if circumstances were different) targeted with the reactive attitudes. He is, after 
all, importantly different from, say, a squirrel, and we might mark that difference by 
saying that it would at least be sensible (it would make sense, it wouldn’t manifest a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the facts) to target him with the reactive  attitudes, 
even if not justified in the actual circumstances. The other candidates for the 
 meaning of “appropriate,” though, all seem to put Strawsonianism on the accounta-
bility side of Watson’s distinction, though in importantly different ways.
Theories of Moral Responsibility
Once we focus on one particular aspect or face of moral responsibility, the next 
natural question to ask is the following: what capacities must a person possess in 
order to be morally responsible in that sense? (A Strawsonian way to put the ques-
tion: which facts about the agent render him an (in)appropriate target of the reactive 
attitudes?) One widely accepted (but vague) answer (its broad contours trace back to 
Book III of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics) (see aristotle) is that the agent must 
have some sort of control over his actions (we’re not responsible for muscle spasms) 
and some sort of knowledge of what he’s doing (we’re not responsible for the results 
of blameless ignorance). Most contemporary work consists in an attempt to under-
stand the requirement of control. (Though Sher [2009] contains an important dis-
cussion of the epistemic component, and Scanlon [1998] develops a theory that 
de-emphasizes the importance of control.)
Perhaps the most notorious way to understand control is as free will, where free 
will in turn is understood as the ability to do otherwise (though that conception of 
free will is itself controversial). This understanding gives rise to the infamous 
Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), which says that an agent is morally 
responsible for some action only if she could have done otherwise than perform it. 
There is much debate over the truth of this principle, in part because it plays a sig-
nificant role in a powerful argument for the conclusion that no one is ever morally 
responsible for anything. Roughly, that argument begins with the claim that our best 
physics and neuroscience seem to show that human actions are determined by 
 relevant scientific laws, and then it proceeds by arguing that determinism is incom-
patible with the ability to do otherwise, and hence, via PAP, that our best physics and 
neuroscience seem to preclude moral responsibility (van Inwagen 1983). This is just 
one of the many ways that the reality of moral responsibility has come under attack; 
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I’ll mention a few more below. For now, though, I’ll simply note that PAP is highly 
controversial, and I’ll point you to the essays in (McKenna and Widerker 2003) for 
the details.
Other prominent accounts of control take it to be a matter of normative  competence. 
Given that the whole game of moral responsibility seems to involve the exchange of 
moral expectations and demands, you are only going to count as morally responsible 
if you are able to play that game, and what it takes to play the game is some sort of 
understanding of normative concepts and an ability to evaluate courses of action 
along a normative dimension (Watson 1987). Different theorists spell this out in 
 different ways.
Fischer and Ravizza (1998), for example, argue that the control required for moral 
responsibility is to be understood in terms of receptivity to reasons (see reasons) 
(the ability to recognize the reasons that there are) and reactivity to reasons (the 
ability to translate those reasons into action). Agents who lack either capacity are 
just not the sorts of creatures that we can reasonably expect to comply with moral 
demands, and hence it would seem inappropriate to target them with the reactive 
attitudes. Reflection on clear cases of nonresponsibility seems to support this view: 
someone who has been hypnotized into doing something unsavory would presum-
ably do that thing no matter what reasons there were to refrain. The hypnotist has 
effectively removed his ability to weigh various reasons there may be for or against a 
course of action, and so his moral agency has been impaired in an important sense. 
This should lead us to judge that it would be inappropriate to blame him for what he 
does under the hypnotist’s suggestion (see manipulation). R. Jay Wallace (1994) 
and Gary Watson (2004b) also emphasize the importance of normative competence.
One last conception of control worth mentioning here comes from the work of 
Harry Frankfurt, which articulates a view according to which moral responsibility 
requires a capacity to reflect on our most basic desires and endorse some rather than 
others, thus “[creating] a self out of the raw materials of inner life” (Frankfurt 1988: 
170). Actions that flow from just the right sort of volitional structure then count as 
truly our own, and we are thus morally responsible for them. Frankfurt’s account, 
then, focuses less on normative understanding and instead emphasizes the impor-
tance of integrity and unity of will.
All of these theories have to deal, in one way or another, with various conceptual, 
metaphysical, and scientific threats to the reality of moral responsibility. Historically 
the most important threats to moral responsibility have been determinism and 
divine foreknowledge. In fact, much of the recent work on moral responsibility has 
been motivated by an attempt to grapple with the threat of determinism, so perhaps 
it is worth saying a bit more about it here.
Roughly, the thesis of determinism is the thesis that the past and the laws of nature 
together determine a unique future. It is particularly problematic for theorists of 
moral responsibility because, on the one hand, it must be either true or false, but on 
the other hand, moral responsibility seems precluded either way. I mentioned above 
one way in which the truth of determinism would threaten moral responsibility – 
via the Principle of Alternative Possibilities – but even if PAP is false, one might still 
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think that the truth of determinism would mean we aren’t the sources of our actions 
in the way required for moral responsibility (Pereboom 2001). The falsity of 
 determinism is also widely thought to be problematic for moral responsibility. After 
all, if my actions fail to be determined by the past (including my own mental states), 
then what I end up doing starts to look like it’s merely a matter of luck, and hence not 
something for which I can be morally responsible (for discussion, see the  introduction 
to Watson 2003).
The threat posed by determinism has given rise to the standard terminology that 
categorizes theorists of moral responsibility: compatibilists think that the truth of 
determinism is compatible with the existence of moral responsibility (Fischer and 
Ravizza 1998); incompatibilists disagree. Among incompatibilists, libertarians 
think that the falsity of determinism is compatible with the existence of moral respon-
sibility (van Inwagen 1983); skeptics disagree and conclude instead that moral 
 responsibility is impossible (Strawson 1994).
Aside from the issue of determinism, though, there are other threats that theorists 
of moral responsibility must face: recent research from social psychology, for 
 example, has cast doubt on the existence of genuine normative competence, given 
how sensitive we unwittingly are to morally irrelevant features of our environment 
(Doris 2002). And there is also the persistent skeptical worry that the conditions of 
moral responsibility are in fact impossible to satisfy, since there seems to be tension 
among our relevant moral beliefs (see moral luck).
In short, our understanding of moral responsibility is still developing, and even as 
it does the legitimacy of its associated practices is being challenged from an 
 ever-increasing number of threats. If we are to get to the heart of the matter, more 
work is needed.
SEE ALSO: aristotle; attitudes, reactive; autonomy; blame; desert; duty 
and obligation; forgiveness; free will; manipulation; moral agency; 
moral luck; punishment; pyschopathy; reasons; sentiments, moral; 
 strawson, p. f.
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